Footnotes

THE FATE OF EUROPE IN THE BALANCE – NELSON'S COPY OF THE ORDER THAT SENT HIM IN PURSUIT OF NAPOLEON AND RESULTED IN THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. The original of this Admiralty Order to Nelson's commanding officer, Earl St Vincent, came with an accompanying letter by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, telling St Vincent that 'the appearance of a British squadron in the Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this moment be stated to depend' (Nicholas Harris Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson, iii, p.24); the Order itself, from which Nelson has made our copy, is in the Nelson Papers (BL Add. MS.34933).

Rumours had been afoot since the spring that Napoleon (as he was to become) was preparing a fleet and invasion force for some unknown purpose at Toulon. The British Cabinet decided therefore to send a squadron into the Mediterranean, from which the British had withdrawn two years earlier. The matter was deemed so urgent that ships had to be transferred from home waters, even at the risk of leaving no margin of error whatsoever in case of invasion.

The opening of the Admiralty Order (which Nelson has not transcribed) states that political affairs had rendered it absolutely necessary that the fleet and armament fitting at Toulon should be prevented from accomplishing its object, and that the Admiralty was therefore reinforcing St Vincent's fleet with eight ships-of-the-line. Having been joined by these ships, St Vincent is instructed 'to lose no time in detaching from your Fleet a squadron consisting of twelve sail of the line and a competent number of frigates under the command of a discreet Flag Officer, into the Mediterranean, with instructions for him to proceed in quest of the said armament, and on falling in with it, or any other force belonging to the enemy, to take or destroy it' (Nicolas, iii, p.24).

The rest of the Order is transcribed by Nelson in the present document; an analysis of which is given by John Sugden: 'Venturing into an area where there were no British bases, [the squadron] would be empowered to seize what supplies it needed from any port that refused provisions and water... But at this stage the service was not regarded as permanent. There was no commitment to an indefinite British return to the Mediterranean. The squadron would simply complete its duties and return' (Nelson: The Sword of Albion, 2012, p.51). Added to the Order, were a set of Additional Instruction by St Vincent, which further expand on the passage transcribed here: 'From the tenor of the instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty which you will receive with this, it appears that their Lordships expect favorable neutrality from Tuscany and the Two Sicilies. In any event, you are to exact supplies of whatever you may be in want of from the territories of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of the Two Sicilies, the Ottoman Territory, Malta, and ci-devant Venetian Dominions now belonging to the Emperor of Germany', and listing other countries that might be relied upon for supplying his squadron (Nicolas, iii, p.26).

(In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that Nelson was later to claim, in the famous codicil to his will, that Emma Hamilton had used her influence with the Queen of Naples to secure such supplies at Syracuse, without which he would have had to abandon his pursuit of Napoleon, and the Battle of the Nile would never have been fought.)

Nelson, the hero of the Battle of Cape St Vincent, had been chosen to lead the squadron by both Earl St Vincent and Earl Spencer over the heads of two senior rear-admirals, one of whom was so angry that he challenged St Vincent to a duel. Nelson was then recuperating from the loss of his right arm eight months earlier. As soon as he recovered, he was sent by Spencer to join St Vincent's fleet, then blockading Cadiz. St Vincent in his turn allowed him only a couple of days respite before despatching him with a small force consisting of three ships of the line and four frigates to gather intelligence on French activity in the Mediterranean.

The Admiralty Order reached St Vincent on the 19 May. On the 21st he forwarded it to Nelson, accompanied by his 'Additional Instructions'. The eight ships promised St Vincent by the Admiralty arrived on 24 May. That same day he detached ten ships from his fleet to join Nelson, which arrived on 7 June, under the command of Captain Troubridge of the Culloden; Troubridge carrying with him the Admiralty Order (providing a terminus post quem for our transcript). The famous 'Band of Brothers' was now assembled and ahead lay several months of searching for the French and, after near-misses and much frustration, the annihilation of Napoleon's fleet at Aboukir Bay on 1 August 1798.

Nelson's handwriting in this document is careful, without the fluency – swagger almost – that was to characterise his writing when thoroughly used to his left hand. Not surprisingly, it contains several trivial slips in transcription (such as "procure" rather than 'obtain' supplies); and he has interpolated in brackets the number of ships intended for the squadron. The phrasing of the filing-docket ("Order from/ Government/ to Ld St Vincent/ May 2d 1798") suggests that it might well have been processed by a civilian, possibly one of the agents responsible for supplying the squadron while hunting for Napoleon's fleet.