Footnotes

'A TERRIBLE AND APPALLING DISASTER HAS OCCURRED. I KNOW NOT HOW TO DESCRIBE IT, OR WRITE ABOUT IT' – records of the Royal Navy career of Admiral Sir Albert Hastings Markham, including the primary account of the sinking of the Victoria by his ship the Camperdown.

The first four volumes cover Markham's career as Captain of HMS Triumph, flagship of the Pacific Squadron during 1879-82, following his various expeditions to the Arctic (see previous lots). They record a visit to the Galapagos Islands, as well as his account of the war between Chile and Peru, and the fall of Lima. The journal also covers an explosion on board caused by xerotine siccative, known as 'patent driers', causing loss of life and terrible burns; and the subject of an Admiralty enquiry.

The next two volumes were kept when in command of HMS Vernon, the shore establishment at Portsmouth housing the Royal Navy's Torpedo Branch, from 1881 to 1886. They are followed by two volumes covering his command of a training squadron comprising his flag ship HMS Active, the Volage, the Rover and Calypso, between 1886 and 1889. Their first cruise was in the West Indies, where Markham was accompanied by his cousin Clements. It was on the races held on 1 March 1887 (a programme for which is tipped into the volume) that the young Robert Falcon Scott came to the notice of Clements; while Scott himself is not named, the races are covered in some detail by Albert's journal.

The concluding two volumes, in the main series, cover Markham's service as Second-in-Command under Admiral Tryon of the Mediterranean Fleet, pride of the Victorian navy, from 1891 to 1893. For most of this time Markham flew his flag on HMS Trafalgar, but also, during refitting, shifted it to the Nile and Camperdown. It was while commanding the Camperdown that the disaster occurred which, in effect, brought his career to a close.

A useful summary is to be found in J. K. Laughton's entry on Tryon for the DNB: "On the morning of 22 June 1893 the fleet weighed from Beyrout, and a little after 2 P.M. was off Tripoli, where it was intended to anchor. The ships were formed in two columns twelve hundred yards apart; and about half-past three the signal was made to invert the course in succession, turning inwards, the leading ships first. The two leading ships were the Victoria, carrying Tryon's flag, and the Camperdown, carrying the flag of the second in command, Rear-admiral Markham. It was clear to every one in the fleet, except to Tryon himself, that the distance between the columns was too small to permit the ships to turn together in the manner prescribed, and by some, at least, of the captains, it was supposed that Tryon's intention was for the Victoria and the ships astern of her to turn on a large circle, so as to pass outside the Camperdown and the ships of the second division. That this was not so was only realised when it was seen that the two ships, turning at the same time, both inwards, must necessarily come in collision. They did so. It was a question of but two or three seconds as to which should give, which should receive the blow. The Victoria happened to be by this short time ahead of the Camperdown; she received the blow on her starboard bow, which was cut open; as her bows were immersed her stern was cocked up, she turned completely over and plunged head first to the bottom. The boats of the other ships were immediately sent to render what assistance they could, but the loss of life was very great. Tryon went down with the ship, and was never seen again. The most probable explanation of the disaster seems to be a simple miscalculation on the part of the admiral, a momentary forgetfulness that two ships turning inwards needed twice the space that one did. As the two ships were approaching each other and the collision was seen to be inevitable, Tryon was heard to say 'It is entirely my fault'".

Many have seen this disaster as, ironically, stifling the culture of greater initiative that Tryon had in fact been trying to inculcate into the Royal Navy with his TA Signalling system. The career of the future Admiral Jellicoe, one of the survivors of the Victoria, is a case in point: "Such was Jellicoe's standing in the service that [after the loss of the Victoria] he was appointed to Ramillies (Captain Francis Bridgeman), the flagship of the new commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, along with Lieutenant Hugh Evan-Thomas, and many other officers who would hold key appointments in the First World War. Flagships have always produced a disproportionate percentage of the senior officers of the next generation, but the Ramillies was unusual, even by the standards of the day. Selected to lay the ghost of Sir George Tryon, and in particular of his controversial command style that emphasized initiative and simple permissive instructions, Culme-Seymour and his staff elevated the science of precision fleet handling to new levels, suppressing the individuality of the captains and junior admirals with a plethora of flag signals... By reducing his squadron commanders to signal-driven automata [Jellicoe] reduced the chances both of defeat, and of victory. In October 1914 he secured Admiralty acquiescence for his reluctance to go too far south, or chase a fleeing enemy too closely for fear of mines. Although the whole world expected a big battle, replaying Trafalgar, Jellicoe knew that the high seas fleet was far better than Villeneuve's scratch force, while his own fleet lacked the battle experience, initiative, and drive that had enabled Nelson to overwhelm his enemy. In falling back on rigid control systems Jellicoe was, unknowingly, replaying an earlier period of British naval activity, when similar rules had been introduced to avoid costly errors by inexperienced officers" (Andrew Lambert, ODNB).

Markham's entry on the disaster and its aftermath covers many pages, beginning with his description of the collision, written on the day itself: "Thursday June 22. Tripoli./ A terrible and appalling disaster has occurred. I know not how to describe, or write about it. The Victoria has ceased to exist and now lies in 80 fathoms of water, dragging down with her, our Com.r in Chief Sir George Tryon and 22 officers and 336 men! It is too dreadful to contemplate, and I can hardly even now believe, or realize, that such a cruel and ghastly accident has actually occurred. We left Beyrout at ½ past 9 this morning, forming in single column in line ahead. In this formation we kept until about 2 P.M. when, nearing our anchorage off Tripoli, the signal was made to form in columns of divisions in line ahead – columns to be 6 cables apart. Of course, the course of the squadron had been altered as necessary to approach our anchorage. At about 3 o'clock the signal was made from the Victoria to alter course 16 points leaders together, the remainder in succession. As the columns were only 6 cables apart I saw that this was not only a dangerous manoeuvre, but one that was impossible to execute without a certainty of collision. I therefore demurred answering it, and told Bradshaw to make a semaphore signal to the C. in C. asking him if there was not some mistake in the signal hoisted. Before my order could be carried out the C. in C. made a semaphore signal to me asking why I did not answer the signal – /I replied that I did not understand it/ he then flashed across me that he wanted my division to turn 16 pts in succession he intended to wheel round my ships which would have been a perfectly safe manoeuvre although / at first/ I was unable to conceive the object that would be gained. This will be understood by the following rough diagrams. Fig. 1 is what I expected he would do – Fig 2. is what was actually done /[diagram follows]/ Acting under this impression and having the utmost confidence in the tactical skill of the C. in C. (who devotes much time to working out tactical problems) I ordered the signal to be answered. On the signal being hauled down, the helm of the Victoria was put hard a starboard, and the helm of the Camperdown hard a port. I watched very attentively the helm indicating signal on board the Victoria, and observing when the ships had altered course 8 points, and were heading towards each other, that no steps were taken to right the helm, and that it was evidently the Admiral's intention to endeavour to turn inside my division, and the impossibility of his executing such a manoeuvre, I ordered Capt Johnstone to go full ahead with the starb.d screw, hoping thereby to decrease our turning circle – seeing that a collision was inevitable I gave orders to go astern full speed with both engines, and at the same time gave directions to close water tight down. Shortly afterwards the stem of the Camperdown struck the Victoria on her starboard bow, about 20 feet before the turret, crashing into her almost to her centre...".

Markham's account of the disaster, written immediately after it happened and recording what he thought Tryon intended, has a claim to be the single most important account of this far-reaching event.

The last volume, written in an original roan-covered notebook and not bound up, covers Markham's time as Commander-in-Chief of the Nore, 1901-2, being able at last to put the Camperdown and Victoria disaster behind him: "After a long weary wait of 7½ years, a spell of professional idleness that had been compulsorily forced upon me, I have at last the satisfaction and the gratification of seeing my flag flying again, and of knowing and feeling that a most regrettable episode in my naval career, had practically come to an end".